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Cinco décadas decorreram desde o espoletar do confl ito cipriota. Apesar da ausência de episó-
dios de violência, o como e o porquê de a reunifi cação não ser ainda uma realidade permanece 
o principal problema a resolver e a questão em torno da qual o debate prospectivo acerca de 
uma solução para a questão do Chipre se centra. Confl ito, defi nido como estado de guerra 
aberta, não ocorre no Chipre desde 1974, no entanto subsiste no seu estado psicológico e so-
ciológico, tendo vindo a constituir-se um importante problema para o qual a comunidade in-
ternacional procura solução. Porque os nacionalismos cipriotas não procuram a independência 
mas a união de território com a Grécia e a Turquia, o arranjo consocionalista de partilha de 
poder gerado aquando da independência veio inculcar o elemento étnico na estrutura política 
do país. O Chipre pós-colonial constitui-se um Estado mas não uma Nação. A guerra, por 
seu lado, institucionalizou a relação adversarial e de desconfi ança entre comunidades, a qual se 
impregna no processo de paz enquanto as comunidades disputam apoio para a sua causa na 
esfera internacional. Iniciativas de mediação levadas, sobretudo, a cabo pelas Nações Unidas, 
mas também pelos Estados Unidos, têm evitado a re-escalada do confl ito mas, no entretanto, 
a UNFICYP transforma-se numa das mais longas missões de paz e um acordo de paz con-
tinua sem existir. As comunidades que fundaram a República do Chipre em 1960 vivem hoje 
em total separação geográfi ca. A sul da “Green Line”, a República do Chipre permanece sob 
governação exclusiva dos cipriotas gregos desde 1963 e, a norte, os cipriotas turcos admin-
istram a auto-proclamada República Turca do Norte do Chipre (RTNC) desde 1983. O 
Chipre assumirá a presidência da UE no segundo semestre de 2012 quando, desde a recusa 
do “Annan Plan” em 2004, apenas o sul cipriota grego tem usufruído da condição de Estado-
Membro. Entretanto, a adesão da Turquia e da RTNC assume-se como a questão central das 
negociações de paz, alongando o caminho para chegada a uma solução.
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Abstract 
The communities that founded the 1960 Republic of Cyprus live today in geographically 
separate territories. South of the “Green Line”, the Republic of Cyprus has been under Greek 
Cypriot administration since 1963, whereas Turkish Cypriots administer a self-declared Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 1983. Because Cypriot nationalisms did not aim at 
independence, but at union with Greece and Turkey, the power-sharing consociational 
arrangement for independence further entrenched the ethnic element into the political 
structure. Post-colonial Cyprus became a State but not a nation. Although conflict, defined as 
open fighting or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974, in a psychological and 
sociological sense it has prevailed and become a growing problem for the international 
community to solve. War institutionalized a mistrustful adversarial relationship that spilled over 
into the peacemaking process with the communities disputing support for their causes in the 
international sphere. Mainly United Nations’, but also United States’, mediation initiatives have 
avoided re-escalation, but while UNFICYP becomes one of the longest peacekeeping missions, 
a permanent settlement is yet to be agreed. Cyprus will assume EU presidency in the second 
half of 2012 when only Greek Cypriots have been enjoying full membership of the EU since the 
refusal of 2004 “Annan Plan” agreement. In the meantime, TRNC’s and Turkish EU full 
membership have become a pivotal issue in the peace negotiations further elongating the 
journey to resolution. Five decades have passed since the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus and, 
although violence is not longer a concern, how and why the reunification problem remains 
unsolved is still an object of debate and so are the prospects for resolution. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Cyprus conflict is one of the longest and most intractable and protracted intrastate conflicts 
of all times, where a physical security deterioration and negative reciprocal images of each other 
have antagonised the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and, together, 
perpetuated and solidified the conflict (Azar 1990), and one which has challenged the 
international communities’ efforts for conflict management and peace establishment. Intrastate 
conflicts often do not remain circumscribed to a single state, but rather overlap state boundaries 
and become internationalized conflicts with consequences that affect the whole international 
system. Played in an intricate web of conflicting local, regional and international interests, the 
Cyprus conflict has become internationalized through two different processes. Largely 
transcending its intrastate dimension, the Cyprus conflict has been internationalized since its 
early stages and mediation initiatives have been taking place for almost half a century without a 
peace settlement being ever implemented or even fully agreed. 
Although the Cyprus conflict has lasted for decades, times of conflict in terms of aggression or 
war have been relatively scarce. A conflict, in a physical sense, defined as a state of open fighting 
or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974. Although in a psychological and sociological 
sense the conflict has prevailed, especially at the Cypriot political leaderships’ level, meaning the 
state of disharmony and opposition between the persons, ideas and interests that shape the 
communities’ actions, the physical dimension has evaporated. With the absence of this 
dimension plus the continuous incapability of the parties to agree on a solution, despite 
numerous international mediation attempts to reunite the Cypriots, the Cyprus conflict has 
become increasingly referred to in the literature as a problem. The conflict is no longer staged on 
the ground but only at a diplomatic sphere, as a question or a situation to be considered, 
answered and solved, thus problem describes the current situation and the character of the 
dispute more accurately.  
Internationalization of an intrastate conflict is broadly understood to happen when other actors, 
beside the original disputants between whom the conflict was initiated, become involved in that 
given conflict. The one generated by the entrance of third parties into the conflict, to lend 
support or fight alongside either the disputants, is referred to as the internationalization through 
conflict, while internationalization through the peace process is a product of the search for a solution 
by the international community and the entrance of actors into the conflict’s environment to 
perform conflict management and resolution tasks (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 2). 
Internationalized at birth, at the local level, the Cypriot conflict context is characterized by 
power, state resources access and demographic asymmetry between a majority of Greek Cypriots 
and a Turkish Cypriot minority, where ethnicity has provided the polarizing and segregating 
dividing line between the Cypriot communities to a destructive stage (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 
35-36) of conflict escalation, of ethnic cleansing and total physical separation. Both disputants 
view conflict and the mediation initiatives as a zero-sum game and both search and count on 
external sympathies and allies to achieve their antithetical interests and aims and, consequently,  
to both parties’ interests the involvement of an external actor who can support and strengthen 
their positions vis-à-vis their opponent’s is seen as vital (Richmond a 1998, 710-711). At the 
regional level, Greece and Turkey’s historically difficult relations and deep mistrust spill over to 
the local level. The “motherlands” are stakeholders in the Cyprus dispute, having vested 
strategic interests on the island, legitimised by their connection to the local communities. At the 
international level, internationalization through the peace process has been provided by the United 
States’ (US) and the United Nations’ (UN) involvement. While the US becomes involved due to 
its interests in avoiding a Greco-Turkish war that could undermine the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and in maintaining a western influence in the region, the UN’s interest 
in becoming involved stems from the realization that the explosive potential of the Cypriot 
dispute is regionally and internationally dangerous. 
The Republic of Cyprus was founded on the 16th of August of 1960 when independence was 
granted to the island by Britain, its colonial ruler. At the time, 80% of the Cypriot population 
was of Greek origin and 18% of Turkish origin, whereas 2% of the population was comprised of 
smaller groups like the British, Armenian, Maronite or Latin communities (Plaza, 1965, 7). 
The Constitution of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus emerged from international treaties reached 
by the UK, the two “motherlands”, Greece and Turkey, and the two largest Cypriot 
communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. The circumstances in which this 
Constitution was conceived and its consequent nature, can be traced back as the trigger of 
events that led to the first intercommunal fighting in 1963 that broke down the 3 year old 
young Republic and mark the beginning of the Cyprus conflict. Notably, the Cyprus conflict 
has had, since its birth, an international dimension due to UK, Greece and Turkey’s strategic 
interests on the island. However, it is only from 1964 onwards, with US and UN peacemaking 
and peacekeeping efforts, that the Cyprus conflict becomes fully internationalized, surpassing its 
original regional sphere, when considered a threat to international peace and security 
(Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 210). More recently, a further internationalization process has 
taken place with Cyprus’ accession to the European Union (EU), which has placed the EU both 
as a main actor and the main stage where the diplomatic Cyprus problem takes place. 
  What this paper proposes to demonstrate is that the dynamics of internationalization have had 
a twofold impact in the Cyprus conflict: while the peace process has, on the one hand, provided 
for the “pacification” of the conflict, on the other hand, the array of actors involved has also 
provided for the intricacy and complexity of the current diplomatic problem. Why, then, did the 
internationalization process have a twofold impact in the Cyprus conflicts’ evolution, to what 
standpoint does this bring the conflict today and how can the prospects for resolution of the 
Cyprus conflict be ameliorated by such an understanding of the conflict’s dynamics?  To provide 
an understanding on the impact of the internationalization processes on the Cyprus conflict’s 
evolution from intrastate conflict to the diplomatic “Rubik’s cube” (UN Secretary General 2003, 
paragraph 4) in which it currently exists, this paper will be divided into three parts. In the first 
part, the “odd” (Plaza 1975, paragraph 163) constitutional arrangement that created the 
Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and the emergence of intercommunal conflict in 1963 will 
demonstrate how the Cyprus conflict has come to be an internationalized dispute between two 
local Cypriot communities ever since the conflict’s embryonic stages. A second part will focus 
on the peace process that immediately followed the emergence of the Cyprus conflict to evaluate 
the impact of the internationalization process initiated by US and UN involvement in the 
conflict management efforts. In a third part, two subsequent changing moments in the Cyprus 
conflict’s context, the setting of a new conflict context and status quo with the Turkish military 
intervention of 1974 and the refusal of the “Annan Plan” and Cyprus’ “partial” accession to the 
European Union (EU), will be analysed as product of the internationalization through conflict 
dynamics and their impact on the peace process evaluated. By identifying and distinguishing the 
internationalization through the conflict and trough the peace process dynamics at these striking four 
conflict moments, an understanding on the need and on how a process of de-
internationalization in the Cyprus case will be provided.    
 
 
1. The International Creation a of State Without a Nation 
 
Unlike “traditional” nationalist movements’ behavioural pattern of fighting for independence 
against colonial powers, in Cyprus the strongest political force against colonial power came from 
Greek Cypriot struggle for union with “motherland” Greece. Greek Cypriot opposition to 
occupation dates back to Ottoman rule when the Orthodox Church of Cyprus began to aspire 
union with Greece, or enosis, which had led to popular rising and a frustrated coup attempt in 
1931 (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 80). To this Hellenist nationalistic movement, led by 
Archbishop Makarios, supported by the AKEL communist wing and The EOKA armed 
resistance group, Turkish Cypriots were compatriots also experiencing an oppressing alien rule 
and, if they were not to joint in the efforts to end British occupation, they were only asked to 
not oppose to their struggle and to refrain from aligning with the British (Solsten 1991). 
However, fearing Greek Cypriot domination, Turkish Cypriots had began reacting to the 
growing enosis campaign with anti-union demonstrations that evolved to pursuing taksim, the 
Turkish word for “division” or “partition”, expressing their desire for the island to be divided 
between Greece and Turkey (Yilmaz 2005, 30).  
When the British transfer the political and administrative power of the island to the Cypriot 
people, the two communities where already antagonized and holding adversarial enemy images 
that would provide for the politicization of their different identities in their future struggle for 
political power over Cyprus (Hadjipavloou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 343). The Zurich-
London Agreements reached by the UK, Greece and Turkey, and accepted by the two Cypriot 
communities, dictated the Republic of Cyprus was to be a state in which executive, legislative 
and juridical power was to be shared. Apart from defining ipsis verbis the future Constitution of 
the independent Cyprus state, the Agreements also comprise three international treaties with 
constitutional force, the Treaty of Guarantee, of Establishment and of Alliance, all generated 
for the purpose guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution. In the Treaty of Guarantee, 
political or economic union with another country or the partitioning of the island are forbidden 
and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are invested “guarantor powers” of the 
“independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic” (art.2) compromising 
themselves to consult each other and to take concerted action if any of the provisions of the 
Constitution are breached. 
Friction over interpretation of the provisions of the constitutional arrangements emerged shortly 
after the independent state was born. In 1963, now President of the Republic of Cyprus, 
Makarios, proposed a set of amendments to the constitution, which became known as the “13 
points”1 (Richmond b1998, 253). These proposed measures were set forward as necessary to 
achieve a good functioning and progress of the State and are generally measures that aim at 
unifying the existing separateness in political and public life but one that had been designed to 
protect Turkish Cypriot access to the political apparatus. Consequently, for Turkish Cypriots, 
the “13 points” were regarded as propaganda to blame the Constitution for the governmental 
crisis when, instead, in their perspective, the government never properly functioned due 
obstacles created by Greek Cypriots for their lack of truthful goodwill to fully implement the 
Constitution (Plaza 1965, 17) and an expression of Greek Cypriot determination to achieve 
enosis. In 1963, constitutional rule collapses as all Turkish Cypriot officials resign their offices 
and intercommunal fighting breaks out at Christmas time. 
The events that lead to the creation of the short-lived 1960 Republic of Cyprus show that 
Cyprus’ transition to a post-colonial order based on the birth of the modern nation-states has 
been one of a peculiar kind. On the one hand, the solution found in the Zurich-London 
Agreements institutionalized the influence of Greece, Turkey and UK over Cyprus and, on the 
other, the differing ethnic characters of the two communities. Thereafter, both communities felt 
the settlement was imposed on them and that their representatives pressured to accept an 
unfavourable arrangement (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 17; Yilmaz 2005, 30). On the other 
hand, the international arrangement that created the Republic did not suffice to turn the 
communities’ leaders away from their atypical nationalist aspirations and the people from their 
cultural and spiritual union with their “motherlands”. Furthermore, the constitutional 
framework did not provide for an evolution of circumstances that could make the rigid division 

1 “Makarios’ 13 points” (1963) among other proposals, suggested the abolition of separate majority voting in the House of 
Representatives for certain law-making, of the President and Vice-President veto power or the unification of justice administration, 
the unification of municipalities, the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives to be elected by unified majority 
voting of the House or the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber. 
of powers obsolete, essentially failing to create the need for the two communities to work 
together (Vlanton and Alicia 1984, 6) in order to dispel deep-sited suspicions and stimulate 
good relationships that promote trust. Also, the international guarantee of the 1960 
Constitution provided in the Zurich-London agreements, inclusively failed to preserve the 
“state of affairs” since Britain feared becoming entangled in its former colonies’ politics and a 
renewed armed conflict, whilst Greece or Turkey where incapable of neutrally intervening 
(Grant 2008, 53). 
The power-sharing consociational political interaction (Sözen 2007, 38) designed for the 
Cypriot state did not remove identity from politics. Instead, it further entrenched the ethnic 
element into the political structure and failed to push loyalty away from the ethnic communities 
to the unified state and to produce one political community that would be able to integrate the 
society around a unified sense of citizenship, political belonging and territoriality. Cyprus had 
become a state but not a nation (Castleberry 1964, 124). On the other hand, the Cypriot 
“atypical” nationalisms coupled with the international agreements that create the Republic of 
Cyprus, entrench and legitimize the guarantor powers’ interests in Cyprus and their 
involvement in the Cypriot political context, providing for the internationalized character of the 
Cyprus conflict at birth.   
 
 
2. Internationalization Through US and UN Involvement in the Peace Process 
 
Pressured by the United Kingdom, the US was the first external actor to become involved in the 
Cyprus conflict management efforts through mediation initiatives. In the Cold War context, 
Cyprus had become strategically vital for the United Kingdom and its allies. The growing 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the withdrawal of troops from Palestine and the Suez 
Chanel and the threat of Turkey aligning with the communist bloc signal the great UK and 
Western interests on maintaining influence over the island (Constandinos 2009, 15). Cyprus 
was a real opportunity for Russia’s influence expansion over the Mediterranean once 
Communist ideology was strongly supported in the island with AKEL being the largest political 
party. Concerned over the impact the growing tension in Cyprus could have on the historically 
tense Greco-Turkish relationship and, consequently, on NATO’s unity against a Soviet attack 
(Constandinos 2009, 14), US’ policy goals toward Cyprus were for it to achieve political stability 
in a democratic, pro-Western, government under the joint protection of Britain, Greece and 
Turkey, thus taking the “fuel and the flame” that could undermine NATO, as well as to secure 
US access to the military facilities on the island by maintaining UK sovereignty over them 
(Adams 1972, 98).  
To achieve a mediated solution that could better serve its interests and policy goals, the US’ 
conflict management and resolution efforts are centred in brokering an agreement between 
Greece and Turkey and not between the Cypriot communities. When Turkey threatened to 
unilaterally intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect Turkish Cypriots when the 
Cypriot state collapses in 1963, a NATO plan is conceived by the US and Britain for action to 
be taken in a way that would not upset Turkish and Western interests. This limited version of 
internationalization of the conflict would avoid a full-fledged internationalization with the UN 
involvement and USSR having a say in it through the Security Council. An independent Cyprus 
threatened Greco-Turkish relations and had hampered those of these states with the US, while 
disrupting NATO, straining the UN and strengthening the Soviet position in the 
Mediterranean.  However, this NATO peacekeeping and peacemaking plan was opposed by 
Greece and Greek Cypriots, who saw in the UN a better tool for protecting their Cypriot 
sovereignty against a Turkish invasion, whereas NATO would probably negate their objectives 
(Coufoudakis 1976, 463).  
With the refusal of the NATO plan Turkey takes action by performing air attacks on Cypriot 
soil and UN involvement becomes unavoidable. Under UN auspices, in a second attempt to 
broker agreement between Greece a Turkey, the US proposes a “double enosis” solution in the 
Acheson Plan that satisfied both Greek and Turkish nationalistic goals of enosis and taksim to 
ease the ethnic tension, but Makarios would not permit the American intention of dissolving 
the Cypriot state to be realised (Brinkley 1988, 11, 13-14).  
The NATO and Acheson plans are a classic exercise of US great power diplomacy and 
realpolitik (Brinkley 1988, 18). The US preferred to neglect the fact that Cyprus, although 
forged recently as state, had not been under control of either Greece or Turkey for decades or 
centuries and that these actors were not at the centre but at the periphery of the Cyprus conflict. 
In the midst of the Cold War, US mediation in Cyrus was devoted to preventing the conflict’s 
internationalization through UN involvement that could facilitate Soviet progression into the 
eastern Mediterranean (Savvides 1998, 40). Even when it was no longer possible to maintain 
the UN at arm’s length, the US continued the isolated pursuit of a settlement for the Cyprus 
conflict by marginalizing the organization’s role in its own mediation initiative, as happened 
during the negotiations of the Acheson plan in Geneva (Savvides 1998, 42). Guided by its own 
interests and concentrated in the avoidance of a Greco-Turkish war, the US perceived the 
Cyprus conflict as a regional and international one and failed to recognise its existence at the 
local level, where in fact it had originated and from where its solution would need to emerge. 
When the UN takes over the peacemaking efforts in the Cyprus conflict, the first UN mediator, 
Galo Plaza, approaches the conflict, not as an international problem but rather as a communal 
one and, from now on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities would always be 
the central actors in the international mediation and negotiation efforts. With this change in 
approach, Greece and Turkey are no longer the central actors, nor are their interests. In the 
previous mediation led by the US, preventing a Turkish intervention was the mediation’s main 
concern and objective that attributed a greater weight to Turkey’s interests and their 
satisfaction. When the mediation initiative is taken over by the UN and executed by the 
organization alone through Plaza and the mediation target shifts from the “motherlands” to the 
communities, from searching for a solution to the problem in its international and regional 
dimensions to its local one, Turkey’s interest automatically became less relevant and were less 
privileged in the proposed solution. The shift in the mediation approach ultimately led to 
Turkey’s unacceptance of Plaza’s proposals.  
The shift from US to UN mediation, ultimately leads to the breakdown of the first and only 
UN mediation event, which will reduce the organization’s mediatory capacity of the Cyprus 
crisis for years to come. Consequently, the organization will find itself limited to performing the 
least intrusive mediation strategies under the good offices of the Secretary General framework in 
order to remain an accepted third party to all parties. On the other hand, with the 
internationalization process provoked by UN entrance in the conflict’s environment, the parties’ 
international status and recognition has become an additional external source of power for the 
parties to enhance their positions in the negotiations process (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 
179). With the internationalization through the peace process, the two Cypriot parties expect 
the international community to exert pressure on their opponent. It is the search for this 
recognition that motivates Greek Cypriot refusal of US proposals and insistence on UN 
involvement, this perception that the UN as mediator would be more receptive and favourable 
to the Greek Cypriot position than the US as mediator had shown to be. The 
internationalization trough the peace process through the involvement of the UN mediator 
mostly favoured Greek Cypriots who where ultimately successful in ceasing the gains by having 
their government recognized as the legitimate one in Cyprus by the UN Security Council in 
resolution 186, but for the Turkish Cypriots as well, the UN provided a forum to expose and 
find legitimacy for their cause and recognition for their administration. Accepted and 
recognized as a party in the UN mediation process of the Cyprus dispute, the UN is, for 
Turkish Cypriots, an agent of legitimization and recognition (Richmond a1998 711-712).  
The unsuccessful attempts of the British and the US to mediate a solution and avoid Turkish 
military action began the process of internationalization, but the containment of this 
internationalization process through NATO is rejected by the Greek flank. The UN alternative 
is preferred and UNFICYP is established and is successful in protecting the cease-fire and 
establishing the necessary peace for peacemaking activities to occur. However, with UN 
involvement, the Cypriot parties become aware of the gains a full internationalization of the 
conflict through the UN can offer their positions, namely making their case internationally and 
gaining international support for their cause. UN’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict is taken 
by the Cypriot communities as an opportunity to achieve acceptance, recognition and 
legitimization for their causes internationally and UN mediation disregarded as a path to 
finding a solution cooperatively (Richmond a1998, 712, 716-721). Making use of increasingly 
mediation styles, the UN will be able, to this day, to pressure the parties into repeatedly coming 
back to the negotiations table and to be cooperative with the mediation process, a capacity that 
stemmed from the organizations’ international status and reputation and the consequent need of 
the parties to project a cooperative image internationally. However, the fact that the UN became 
limited in its peacemaking capacity at the outset of its involvement, due to the impact of the shift 
from US approach to Plaza’s approach, it became incapable of countering the two Cypriot 
parties’ focus on trying to capitalize on internationalization gains the UN itself could offer and 
resist settlement (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 21 and Richmond a1998, 10, 37-39, 714). 
 
 
3. The Internationalized Intrastate Conflict’s Growing Intractability 
 
With US and UN involvement in the Cyprus conflict’s management new actors and interests 
are added to the Cyprus conflict bowl and the internationalization of the Cypriot intrastate 
conflict, in its twofold dynamics, is fully realized. The US and the UN have been, ever since, 
involved in managing the Cyprus conflict, the US being more present and active in the first 
decade of conflict and the UN relentlessly ever since, performing various tasks within the 
conflict management and resolution spectrum, most importantly, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
mediation activities. However, the Cyprus peace process, especially the peacemaking efforts, have 
been derailed not only due to the rigid and adversarial positions held by the Cypriot 
communities throughout the peace negotiations but, most importantly, to the changing 
circumstances in the conflict itself, which disrupt, stalemate and setback the breakthroughs and 
partial agreements found, and which also feed into the disputants’ mistrustful relations.     
The 1974 status quo generated by Turkish military presence on the island and the accession to 
the EU are two turning points in the Cyprus conflict that demonstrate how the 
internationalization through conflict dynamics have impacted on the Cyprus peace process. If 
Turkish military presence and the consequent partition of the Cyprus island’s territory reduced 
Turkish Cypriot security concerns and empowered their position vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, 
thereby reducing the minority-majority asymmetry that existed between the Cypriot parties 
until then, with the refusal of the Annan Plan and Cyprus’ accession to the EU as a partitioned 
state affected the conflict’s dynamics and balance of power, this time, by empowering Greek 
Cypriots vis-à-vis the Turkish flank. Both the 1974 and the 2004 events have contributed to 
the growing intractability and protractedness of the Cyprus conflict and constant setbacks in the 
peacemaking efforts, have fed into the Cypriot parties’ lack of will to compromise on a solution 
with each other.     
 
3.1 The 1974 “Status Quo” 
 
Until 1967, an uneasy peace had prevailed with the presence of the UNFICYP in Cyprus. In 
April that year, the civil government of Papandreou in Greece was overthrown by a military 
junta. A split between Athens and the Greek Cypriot Government began to take place as 
Makarios became weary of merging Cyprus with the dictatorship. Baked up by the new regime 
in Greece, who saw him as the best man to replace Makarios, General Grivas, leader of the 
Cypriot National Guard, starts pressuring Turkey by sending heavily armed troops to patrol the 
Turkish Cypriot enclaves and tension rises sparking intercommunal fighting (Solsten 1991). In 
1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership announces the formation of a “Provisional Turkish 
Cypriot Administration” to, presumably, transitionally govern the community until the 1960 
Constitution is fully re-established, a provisional administration readily interpreted by Greek 
Cypriots as a step towards partition (Solsten 1991).  
On the 15th of July, the Greek junta undertakes its coup d’état against Makarios and replaces 
him with Nikos Sampson (Anderson 2008, 12). Turkey promptly demanded that Greece 
remove Sampson from the Cypriot Presidency, that Greek officers are withdrawn from the 
National Guard and a guarantee be given that Cyprus would remain independent thereafter 
(Solsten 1991). Greece and Sampson refused to comply with Turkish demands and Britain to 
take part in the requested intervention. Since the coup was undertaken by Greece, Turkey 
understood that the Treaty of Guarantee had been breached and decided to intervene 
unilaterally and an all-out war began in Cyprus that shapes reality on the island to this day. 
The Turkish forces were able to progress quickly on the ground and seize 37 percent of the 
island’s territory, setting their predetermined “Attila line” from Morphou Bay, in the north 
shore, to Famagusta, in the southeast. Thousands of people were dead and wounded, both 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, and migration took place on a large pace, as Greek 
Cypriots were fleeing their homes in the north to escape Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot 
combatants and Turkish Cypriots in the south were running for protection in the north 
(Anderson 2008, 13). The number of refugees quickly amounted on both sides of the barricade. 
The right of return of these people and their property rights will become a sensitive issue of 
contention between the two communities in the future course of peace negotiations.    
To separate the opposing forces, UNFICYP established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone. The 
“Green Line”, as it came to be known, has become vital ever since in the prevention of the 
reoccurrence of fighting, with UN troops supervising land and air throughout the whole 
extension of the buffer zone (UNFICYP 2011). In 1974, the northern flank of the Green Line 
became under total control and occupation of the Turkish army. In February 1975 Turkey 
annexes the area to its territory, proclaiming it the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which 
will remain so until 1983. 
Since the Turkish intervention of 1974, despite sporadic events of aggression between Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot individuals, there have been no outbursts of violence. From then 
on, the Cyprus conflict enters a new phase of consecutive peace talks and mediation attempts. 
However, the intractability of the internationalized conflict, the antagonistic objectives, the 
hidden agendas and the overwhelming mistrust the two communities developed towards each 
other will carry its toll on the peacemaking efforts to finding a longstanding solution. From 1974 
onwards, Cyprus ceases to be a conflict, in a physical aggression perspective, to become a 
growing problem for the international community to solve.  
 
3.2 Renewed Conflict Internationalization with EU Accession 
 
Greek Cypriot application to the EC and the consequent refusal of the Annan settlement Plan 
in 2004 is another identifiable changing moment in the Cyprus conflict. On the 1st of May of 
2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, while 76 percent of Greek 
Cypriots rejected it (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 72), only the Republic of Cyprus 
became a EU member-sate and the island remains divided and militarized to the present day. 
On the Greek Cypriot side of the dividing line created in the 1974 events, the Republic of 
Cyprus has continued to exist as it had been since the Turkish Cypriots left the government in 
1963, governed solely by Greek Cypriots under the very same Constitution of 1960. 
Economically, the Republic of Cyprus has exponentially flourished. The tourist industry has 
greatly contributed to the modernisation and economic success of the Republic. With a per 
capita income superior to that of Greece or Portugal and one of the lowest unemployment rates 
in the EU, the Republic became a member of the European Union in 2004 and a member of the 
Monetary Union in 2008. Having an European integrated economy, Greek Cypriots enjoy, 
today, a western European standard of living and life style (Solsten 1991). North of the Green 
Line, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally proclaimed an 
independent sate on the 15th of November of 1983, being immediately declared illegal by the 
Security Council in resolution 541 and not being internationally recognized by any state, except 
from Turkey, to this day. A parliamentary democracy was established with its own Constitution 
approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate in 1985. Faced with an international embargo 
imposed by the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC was isolated and became greatly dependent on 
subsidies from Turkey and enjoys a limited autonomy, the police are controlled by the Turkish 
army and the local government costs are entirely covered by Ankara (Solsten 1991).  
When Cyprus became a EU member in a package of ten European countries, mainly eastern 
European, a solution to the Cyprus problem was supposed to have been accomplished under the 
auspices of Secretary General Kofi Annan but the “no” from the Greek Cypriot community in 
the referendum of the “Annan Plan” prevented the country from being reunified prior to the 
date set for EU ascension. An important enlargement to the east was underway and with the 
threat of Greece vetoing the whole enlargement process if Cyprus was not guaranteed accession, 
the EU did not wish to prevent nine other countries from entering due to the stalemate in 
Cyprus (Keith 1997, 31). The EU conferred membership to the whole island, and therefore did 
not a priori exclude the Turkish Cypriot side from being part of the Union, however, since it 
only recognizes the government of the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate, only the Greek Cypriot 
side has been enjoying full membership since 2004. 
Although the EU acceptance of Cyprus accession aimed at accelerating the conflict resolution 
process, it became a third party to the conflict when it relinquished the necessity of the conflict’s 
resolution prior to Cyprus’ admission as a member-state and one who, in the end, has supported 
the Greek Cypriot side. For Greek Cypriots, instead of representing an opportunity for peace 
and prosperity and for a new collaborative relationship to develop among the two communities, 
the Annan Plan referendum was viewed as an opportunity to protect their identity and reinforce 
their sovereignty under the EU umbrella (Michael 2007, 597). The Annan Plan is, in fact, a 
product of decades of mediated negotiations and exhaustive discussions on each issue and that 
during the Annan Plan negotiations none of the content of the negotiations were new to the 
parties nor were they issues on which they had not previously debated or even agreed on. 
The Annan mediation was, in the end, a victim of EU’s inability to pursue a consistent Cyprus 
policy and to persist requiring a unification solution as the condition for accession and, 
consequently, the EU was viewed by the Greek Cypriot leadership a larger international arena 
were the conflict could continue to be played out (Michael 2007, 599) and in which Greek 
Cypriots would be empowered and gain advantage not only over Turkish Cypriots but, more 
importantly to them, over Turkey by gaining a vote on Turkey’s own accession to the EU. Once 
again, instead on focusing in finding a solution for their conflict, the Cypriot parties, in this case 
the Greek Cypriots, bet on the gains provided by the continued internationalization of the 
Cyprus problem and choose to gain advantage over the Turkish Cypriot in order to achieve a 
more favourable agreement for themselves in the future instead of settling and ending the 
dispute at that given moment (Richmond a1998 714).  
The refusal of the Annan Plan and the consequent “atypical” EU accession is an event that will 
again change the conflict’s status quo and, therefore, the mediation’s dynamics once the parties’ 
power balance is shifted to Greek Cypriots favour, disempowering the Turkish flank and 
rendering Turkish Cypriots a weaker position in the new asymmetrical relationship (Nicolet 
1999, 99). For the Turkish Cypriots it has become vital to enjoy full membership of the EU and 
put an end to decades of isolation that have deterred its development and increased the 
economic gap between the two Cypriot Communities. TRNC’s and Turkish EU full 
membership has become a pivotal issue in the peace negotiations, one that has been played by 
both sides, altering the stakes, the strategies and positions and further elongating the journey to 
resolution. In this context, Turkey’s accession also becomes entangled in the Cyprus problem 
with the Greek Cypriot side blocking its entry to strengthen its position at the negotiations 
table with the Turkish Cypriots and, thus, the EU becomes both the main setting and one of 
the main actors in the Cyprus conflict (Michael 2007, 603).  
Cyprus’ membership of the EU was not properly used as a “carrot and sticks” strategy, and could 
have been decisive if used correctly, but did not do so because the EU failed to hold it as such 
for both of the Cypriot parties and was a third party biased towards the Greek Cypriots. The 
rejection of the Annan Plan is the indirect consequence of the change in the conflict’s context, 
which leads to the current impasse and deadlock. With the failure of an “United Republic of 
Cyprus” to have acceded to the EU, Cyprus has become the crucial issue in Turkey’s relations 
with the EU, who has held penalizing discourse towards Turkey as the invader of an EU 
member-state (Güney 2004, 38). The EU’s involvement in the Cyprus problem has contributed 
to the internationalization through conflict process but, since the conflict is now only played at 
the diplomatic level, the events generated by the internationalization through conflict dynamics 
impact, not on the conflict itself (since it is inexistent), but on the peace process dynamics by 
making the parties less willing to cooperate on a joint settlement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Cyprus conflict has an international character from the start due to the de-colonization 
international process that created the Republic of Cyprus. It can also be considered that the 
birth of the Cypriot state itself was internationalized as it was a product of international 
conferences and an international agreement (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 208). Due to the 
specific character of the Cypriot nationalistic aspirations of union with the “motherlands” 
coupled with Greece and Turkey’s vested strategic interests on the island, these two actors are 
drawn into the conflict at its early stages. When the first mediation attempts occur in the 
Cyprus conflict, the conflict has already been internationalized through Greece and Turkey’s 
involvement to support the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot factions. Internationalization 
already existed in the conflicts’ context but it increased with the transition to a peace process, 
when more international actors, the US and the UN, became involved (Raheem and 
Loganathan 2005, 3). The Cyprus conflict becomes internationalized through the peace process 
when it is sensed and recognized by the international community as being a problem that merits 
its intervention.  
The search for the fulfilment of their mutually exclusive interests and objectives has provided 
the Cypriot communities the perception of the dispute as a zero-sum game, where one side’s 
gain corresponds to the other side’s loss (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 143). Trapped 
in their opposing positions, the Cypriot parties have looked, through the internationalization 
processes, for outside parties that could transform their win-lose game. The search for the 
involvement of an outside party to support their positions and maximize the potential of 
realization of their interests in detriment of those of the other has been the pattern of Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot behaviour in the Cyprus conflict and one that maintained the 
“motherlands”, Greece and Turkey, at the epicentre of the dispute (Richmond b1998 XV). 
Internationalization can be the key to explaining the longevity and intractability of the Cyprus 
conflict, however it is the existence of multiple actors and interests in the conflict’s context itself 
that complexify the conflict. Internationalization through the conflict sets the conditions for 
protractedness in the Cyprus conflict and, although the internationalization through the peace 
process multiplied the panoply of actors involved, it is not in this process that the reasons for the 
conflict’s durability are found. Internationalization through conflict, rather than 
internationalization through the peace process, has rendered the Cyprus conflict intractable and 
protracted. The 1974 events, with the opposing interventions from Greece and Turkey, and EU 
accession process are the two main events prolonging the Cyprus conflict. These events 
exacerbated the conflict and increased its duration because they transformed the conflict’s 
context and altered the balance of powers between the deeply antagonized Cypriot communities 
who, empowered by the internationalization gains at the conflict level, become resistant 
entering agreement with one-another. Because aggression has been relatively infrequent and the 
numerous attempts at resolution have unavoidably ended in failure, the Cyprus “conflict” has 
become less of a conflict and increasingly a lengthy and protracted problem for the parties 
involved and for the international community to solve. 
It cannot be ignored that the conflicts’ internationalization through the peace process 
contributed to the Cypriot parties’ continuing to view the conflict through an “adversarial lens” 
(Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 347) by offering new opportunities for the 
ethnic-antagonized parties with zero-sum perceptions of their conflicting issues to maximize 
their positions vis-à-vis the other. The Cypriot parties utilized the internationalization of the 
conflict through the UN as a means to publicizing their positions and gaining international 
support for their causes and with this trying to alter unfavourable status quos (Coufoudakis 1976, 
466). However, these interests held by the Cypriot parties allowed for the UN to mediate the 
dispute and for the needed level of pacification to exist in the conflicts’ context that can 
ultimately allow for a solution to be found. To devise a settlement between two highly 
antagonized ethnic groups is a hard, complex and time-consuming endeavour, however, UN 
and US mediating assistance has been crucial to the Cyprus conflict becoming less critical, 
dangerous and deadly. It has impacted on the parties’ demands and preferences and the 
improved their previously violence-prone relationship and made them flexibilize their positions 
and demands by who abandoning their enosis and taksim demands for less-exclusive and more 
compatible goals, into to the demand of an united state to that of a federal solution even though 
differing interpretations have lead to other incompatibilities (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and 
Trigeorgis 1993, 347-348). The Cyprus peace process is often referred to as a failed one but, 
although a solution is yet to be arrived at and the mediation process itself could have been more 
expedite in fully capitalizing on ripe moments, it cannot be said that it has accomplished 
nothing since it has generated the necessary environment for peacebuilding tasks to take place, 
such as reconstruction and intercommunal activities and the continuation and diversification of 
these tasks is increasingly more important to maintain and continue to stimulate intercommunal 
contact. 
Internationalization through the peace process is, despite the negative impact it can have on 
highly antagonized disputants who are unwilling to settle, a motivation for the parties to choose 
peace and stop fighting. Internationalization through the peace process allows for international 
funds to be allocated for post-conflict relief and reconstruction and for economical and societal 
recovery to begin (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 4).  
The fact that internationalization has, on the one hand, provided for pacification of the Cyprus 
conflict while, on the other, for the intricacy of the diplomatic problem that exists today, is a 
product of the two different internationalization dynamics that have been taking place in the 
conflict’s context ever since its embryonic stages. Internationalization through conflict and the 
involvement of third parties who lend their support to either the parties, whether actively or 
tacitly (as was the case for the EU) has contributed to exacerbate the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot antagonism, originating events that shift the balance of power between two 
ethnically-antagonized parties who resist entering agreement with one-another, which has 
limited the conflict resolution achievements in the peace process. Internationalization through 
the peace process, even given its shortcomings, has had the capacity to prevent violence and to 
mitigate physical conflict and, even though this process does provide incentives for the Cypriot 
communities not to settle and, instead, to continue to look for new allies and supporters in the 
international arena, it is in the changing circumstances of the conflict’s context, provoked by its 
internationalized character, that contribute to the protractedness of the diplomatic imbroglio, 
once the conflict is no longer set on the ground,          
Future Prospects and the Dynamics of De-Internationalization 
 
The most recent round of Cyprus talks have been started in 2008 after a four-year stand-off 
following the demise of the Annan Plan. A solution continues to be sought, now in a “Cypriot-
led and Cypriot owned” (UN Secretary General 2010, paragraph 27), negotiation on the 
creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation where the two federated states would enjoy 
political equality, but the core unagreeable issues have historically remained the same: those of 
governance and power-sharing, the issue of return or compensation of lost property provoked by 
the migration movements of 1974, the demarcation of the territory to belong to each of the two 
federated states and the security and guaranties for the new state of affairs, which revolves on the 
dismissal or maintenance of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (UN Secretary General 
2010, paragraphs 17-33).    
 The “EU-ization” (Michael 2007, 601) of the Cyprus problem has, nonetheless, had a positive 
impact by providing economic and security incentives that have facilitated coexistence and 
opened up interaction on the island allowing for the opening up of the crossing points. This has 
also the positive effect at the grassroots level by making Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
citizens less susceptible to their political leaderships’ political preferences while, at the same 
time, the EU offers them an alternative source of identity either then their ethno-nationalistic 
ones. However, even if not part of the EU, it was important that the Turkish Cypriot 
community would still be represented in the EU institutions as a part of the Cyprus delegation. 
This would be an important step that would be able to capitalize on an opportunity for the two 
communities’ reaproachment and, also, a political interaction experience (Michael 2007, 601) 
and is, perhaps, a solution that must be hastened and found before the Cypriot presidency 
comes into being in 2012. However, as success prospects of present negotiations remain dim, 
the Cyprus problem seems destined to continue entangled in Turkey’s accession and continue 
stalemated for much longer. In the meantime, Turkey continues to leverage the Cyprus issue to 
attain EU membership while not fully implementing the needed democratization, rule of law 
and minority and human rights respect and protection to meet the EU criteria, while the EU 
follows a ambiguous policy of continuously accepting to restart Turkey’s accession negotiations 
without ever demanding that Turkey terminates what it regards as an illegal occupation of its 
territory in Cyprus nor demanding that the Turkish recognize the Republic of Cyprus (Stavridis 
2006, 89). 
Common interests and mutual benefits from a settlement still exist and can be shared by the 
two communities but, towards its attainment, the change in the external/regional environment 
is key to the Cyprus problem, that is, changing the relationship between Greece and Turkey in 
order for a positive congruence of the internal a external dimensions of the Cyprus problem to 
exist and allow relaxation in the communities relationship and generate a proactive negotiations 
process (Michael 2007, 590). In communal terms, the conflict appears to no longer exist or to 
not having the potential to be as pervasive as it once was, that is why the Cyprus problem is also 
not a conflict anymore as it seems to no longer exist in the daily-lives of the Cypriot 
communities, except for the existence of the Green Line, but one that increasingly does not 
make sense to two differently but growingly “europeanized” communities. The Cyprus conflict 
appears today as being one carried by political leadership, one that is executed by the foreign 
policies of all intervenient and that has the EU as its major stage and conflicting issues source.  
Central to the resolution of internationalized intrastate conflicts is “the de-internationalization 
of the problem and its ‘proper’ redefinition as a bilateral issue” (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 
211), that is, in the conflict’s context, between the two Cypriot communities. However, the 
internationalization through the conflict features have not been mitigated, and this has an 
explanatory value to why the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. Although in the Greek flank, 
Greece has for long lost its influence upon Greek Cypriot policy-making, in the Turkish flank, 
Turkey remains as party to the dispute, mainly due to Turkish Cypriot clientelism and 
dependence towards Turkey. Enabling the Turkish Cypriot community to be less dependent 
upon Turkey’s economic support is key to eliminating the internationalization through conflict 
features of the Cyprus problem, and thus for it to be resolved.  
The Cypriot parties’ perceptions of the conflict and the way in which they frame a solution need 
to be transformed. Greek Cypriots need to accept that Cyprus must belong to both 
communities and their demand for the Greek Cypriot 1974 refugees return to their homes to 
the north be satisfied. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, need to realize that they cannot 
indefinitely occupy a large part of the island and their need for security and for not feeling 
threatened by Greek Cypriot domination must be met (Nicolet 1999, 106-107).  Despite the 
continuing mediation efforts since the 1960s, still no settlement has been achieved between the 
Cypriot communities. As long as internationalization features allow for each of the communities 
to hold stakes over the other, the Cyprus problem will remain unsolved.  
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